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October 29, 2007

Early exits

A little while back, Aner Ravon wrote a heartfelt post about the state of Israeli high tech, specifically the fact that Israeli startups tend to exit too early (generally via acquisition) instead of developing into large, mature companies.

The Israeli high tech scene fails to produce sustainable, ongoingly growing, companies. The problem is not the Israeli landscape, the problem is probably with having a wrong dream.

When it’s all about the Exit, focus shifts from succeeding as a company to succeeding as investors, speculators. From creating to trading. Operational record is overlooked for dream weaving. This is why Boaz Eitan walks out with $100M for having successfully sold a multi billion dollar balloon to investors despite having no operational evidence at any point.

The question why this is so often comes up for discussion by people inside the country’s high-tech industry. (Daniel Cohen addressed it in a piece about “The Quest to Create an Israeli Nokia”). While Israel has shown itself capable of creating international category leaders – Teva, Check Point, and Amdocs spring to mind – the actual number of these is small, and none have really sprung up for nearly 15 years.

Aner lays most of the blame with the money guys:

Most Israeli startups are funded by VCs, Israeli and American, who in turn get most of their funding from out of Israel investors. This is good and bad. The VC model is based on selling their share for the highest amount in the shortest time. The fundamental focus of a “business” is to create a profit. Unfortunately, these two foci’s correlate less often then they do. An IPO may mean such correlation, as the VC can sell it’s share and the company can grow. However, very few companies fit the IPO model, and most companies are forced to think about their “business” in different terms. Terms such as “comparables”, “size of the (exit) opportunity”, “exit strategy” and “fitting the investment portfolio” take precedence and management attention away from real business decisions. Innovation becomes more important than operations because ideas can be sold earlier in the lifecycle. This means the company must be sold to a company who believes it can turn innovation to operations. Sold to, not become one.

I don’t want to argue that he is wrong, because a lot of these points have merit. The venture capital model does present certain problems (mainly the time horizon) when it comes to growing a big company. There have certainly been cases where investors have pressured companies to exit when they had the potential to become much larger. And yet, at the risk of being an apologist for the VC industry, the situation is a lot more complicated.

Other factors contributing to the relative paucity in the development of large-scale tech companies in Israel include:

  • The entrepreneurs themselves – In some cases, as mentioned, investors will push entrepreneurs into exiting too early. But in many other cases it can be argued that VCs try to keep entrepreneurs from going for exits in the mid- ten million range that might be good for the entrepreneurs but lousy for the investors.

    To put another way, it is the rare entrepreneur (especially in Israel) who won’t give in to the temptations of a $200M exit. Very, very few people have the cojones of a Mark Zuckerberg.

  • The lack of a local market – The fact that Israel has managed to grow a tech industry at all is impressive given its basic situation. We are a tiny little country, whose inhabitants speak a native tongue that nobody else does, cut off geographically from all of its potential markets. All this means that Israeli companies need by definition to be oriented towards overseas markets. As a result, a lot of non-technological functions end up being shipped off overseas instead of staying in Israel. This leads to…
  • Management issues – Israel has traditionally had problems growing management capable of making the jump from a $100 million-level company to a $1 billion level company. The situation has improved in recent years, ironically as more Israeli executives have served time in international companies. But there are still way too few international-grade managers to go around.
  • The financial environment – You should also remember not to discount the general financial environment. The wild IPO environment in the late ‘90s and beginning of this decade has been dampened for years. And while the TASE is growing continuously, it is still considered a backwater financial market. Meanwhile, investment banking and other financial services are still relatively primitive. All this has led to greater M&A (well, A) activity rather than IPOs.

It should also be pointed out that Israel doesn’t necessarily want a Nokia, in the sense that Nokia completely dominates Finland’s technology industry.

The question is whether this is all leading in one direction – as Aner suggests – that direction being downwards. But that is a question for another day.

October 23, 2007

New feature coming soon

The List is undergoing some interesting changes and will be up in its new incarnation soon.

Stay tuned.

October 21, 2007

On the Changing Web Investment Landscape

Ycombinator A recent blog post by Y Combinator’s Paul Graham has caused a fair deal of buzz around the VC end of the blogosphere. In his essay, Graham points to a number of trends that he sees in the software/internet startup world and makes a number of predictions as to where the industry is headed.

In Graham’s view, we can expect to see a lot more startups founded by younger entrepreneurs needing a lot less funding; a standardized process on the part of investors to streamline the investment process; a more sophisticated attitude towards acquisition by major players; as well as a decrease in the importance of a college degree compared to technical skills and experience.

On the heels of the piece, we’ve seen numerous blog posts analyzing Graham’s points, focusing on the changing landscape (when it comes to Internet companies), and openly suggesting that the traditional VC model is broken and that we need to adapt ourselves to the new world order.

Graham, I believe, is spot-on with a lot of his analysis even though I don’t fully accept his conclusions. Here at Giza we’ve seen the local Internet scene develop greatly over the last couple of years. Our deal flow is filled with the types of companies Graham describes: young guys (and gals) with great ideas who don’t need a lot of funding to get started.

Our Ofek seed-stage program is designed for this environment: provide the relatively small initial sums for a company to reach pre-defined milestones and then decide whether to continue on to a major Round A. So far, we have made four investments this year under the auspices of the program, with Koolanoo Group having already graduated into a full portfolio company.

Like I said, I have a couple of caveats about Graham’s piece and the Y Combinator approach in general. A big part of it is the model and the potential scale. Y Combinator’s business model (also shared by investors such as First Round Capital) is predicated on making small investments in each particular company, then enjoying potentially good returns even on small-scale exits.

In theory, this should work fine. In practice, it runs up against issues of scale. Again in theory if you fund enough startups like this, one or two of them might be classic VC-grade home runs (say $100M plus exits). The question is how many you have to fund.

Graham talks about what happens when Y Combinator has to deal with 10,000 companies. Obviously, they’ll never be able to deal with 10,000 companies, let alone 1,000. Unless you’re planning on being a source of capital c’est tout, you need to provide some management attention to each of your portfolio companies. This is feasible for 20 or 30 companies at a time, depending on your staff size and the amount of streamlining you are able to do. It becomes increasingly hairy after that.

So you have to then wonder what types of returns – not multiples, but actual objective money – you can get from a strategy based on a few dozen companies with relatively small exit avenues.

And then there is the matter of follow-on funding: few are the companies that grow into significant Web properties without some degree of marketing. Which means that you go from investing a few hundreds of thousands of dollars to investing two or three million.

In short, big questions indeed. As a rule, I think that seed-stage investment approaches like Ofek are the right way to go for many of the Internet companies that we see. (And even then, I should point out that since the model is relatively new we have little data on the actual outcomes). Whether it will completely take over the VC biz, count me skeptical. 

October 17, 2007

The List - Oct. 17

Thelist Every week we run across a number of articles that catch our eye. As a regular feature, we round them up for a little something we call The List: